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LAW REFORM IN A MIXED 'CIVIL LAW' AND
'COMMON LAW' JURISDICTION*
T. B. Smith**
It is high honour indeed to deliver the fourth Tucker
Lecture on the Civil Law and to follow the three previous
scholars of the highest distinction for whom I feel warm affection as well as admiration.1
Mixed Jurisdictions
A mixed jurisdiction such as Quebec, Louisiana, South
Africa and Scotland, is one which, though basically civilian or
romanistic, has been influenced to some extent by the
Anglo-American common law. In 1963 at the Louisiana State
Law Institute's Colloquium on Civil Law, I talked about "The
Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in Mixed Jurisdictions;" in a sense, that lecture, 2 serves as a preface to the
present discussion. Some of the points may bear reexamination in the light of events since 1963 and in the new
dimension of law reform with which I am now concerned. In
1965 the Law Commissions Act 3 set up two Law Commissions:
one for England and Wales; and the other for Scotland, the
Scottish Law Commission. I served on the Scottish Law
Commission as Commissioner on a part time basis since 1965,
but from 1972 this has been my main work. In describing
the various aspects of law reform in Scotland, some passing
consideration will also be given to the other "mixed jurisdictions" such as that of Louisiana from which we receive enlightenment from time to time.
* The expression, "common law" is used with some regret in the
Anglo-American sense. In Scots Law, "common law" has a different meaning
corresponding to droit commun, diritto commune, etc. in European systems.
This article is an expansion of the fourth of the Tucker Lecture Series,
delivered at the Louisiana State University Law School on February 20,
1975.
** Honorary Professor of Law, University of Edinburgh, Scotland;

member of Scottish Law Commission.
1. See Zepos, The Legacy of Civil Law, 34 LA. L. REV. 895 (1974); David,
The Civil Code in France Today, 34 LA. L. REV. 907 (1974); Cr~peau, Civil
Code Revision in Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 921 (1974).
2. T. B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed
Jurisdictions"in CiviL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 3 (A. Yiannopoulos ed.
1965).
3. Law Commissions Act 1915, c. 22.
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With the exception of Scotland, it seems that the mixed
jurisdictions have resulted from double colonisation or its
close equivalent. 4 There has normally been colonisation by a
state with a civilian system-France, Spain or the
Netherlands-followed by annexation or purchase by a state
governed wholly or mainly by the Anglo-American common
law. Ascendancy of common law influence is then secured, at
least for a time, by establishing an ultimate appellate jurisdiction and the control of legislation; by introducing, where
necessary, English as an official language; and by investing
the judges with a special prestige. The role of the bureaucracy in forcing through uniform solutions has been hitherto
underestimated. Procedure and the style of administering
justice tend to follow the common law pattern rather than a
civil law pattern. Certain branches of law-especially criminal law, commercial law, constitutional law and fiscal lawmay well be grafted more or less completely from common law
stock. As the role of judge and judge-made law gains ascendancy, the roles of the jurist and of indigenous legal literature tend to decline in importance. However, those mixed
systems which have their private law in codified form, or use
a language other than English, can probably more easily
resist undue influence from the common law-though they do
not always or completely succeed. One tends to find in all the
mixed systems three legal attitudes among practitioners and
jurists: first, those (mainly practitioners supported by commercial interests) who favour so called law reform by increasingly importing common law style solutions; secondly, those
who are prepared to introduce carefully selected and comparatively evaluated common law type solutions; and thirdly,
those (including a strong element of jurists) who react emotionally against any common law type of legal influence.
Constitutional and Governmental Problems
Scots law, one of the uncodified "mixed systems," has
somehow managed to survive despite pressures for assimilation to English law which have no real counterpart
4. See T.B. Smith, The Preservationof the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed
Jurisdictions"in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 11 (A. Yiannopoulos ed.
1965); ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: PROPERTY § 228 (F. Lawson
ed. in press); T.B. SMITH, Introduction to STUDIES CRITICAL AND COMPARATIvE

(1962).
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elsewhere. For example, I know of no other unitary state
other than the United Kingdom with a plurality of legal systems but with only one centralised executive and legislature
serving these systems--and that legislature and executive
overwhelmingly dominated by representatives of one country
in that state. Moreover, the policies of the very large central
Government Departments, including those concerned with
foreign affairs, trade, industry, natural resources and
employment are primarily concerned with legislation of a
form and content which seem appropriate for the larger country. Though the Scottish Law Commission has the will and
the capacity to recommend sound reforms and has achieved a
good number, the whole constitutional and bureaucratic
structure related to law reform for Scotland is at present so
ill conceived as to provoke mirth or tears according to the
viewpoint of the observer. For this situation, the Scots themselves are to some extent to blame.
However, we seem to be on the threshold of radical constitutional changes-which could have important consequences for legislative reform in Scotland and Britain. The
former Prime Minister, Mr. Heath, of the Conservative Party,
took the United Kingdom into the European Economic Communities (E.E.C.) almost certainly against the wishes of the
majority of the electorate-who in any event had a minimal
grasp of what was involved. Subsequently, Britain has been
shaken by the general economic blizzard. Prices of food, for
example, have risen steeply, and the average voter probably
concludes that the ills which have befallen the country are
due to her accession to the Treaty of Rome. Mr. Wilson, the
present Labour Prime Minister, pledged himself and his Government to hold a referendum in June 1975 on the issue
whether Britain should withdraw from the European Communities. Mr. Wilson and a number of his Ministers were in
fact anxious to stay in, while other Ministers were vehement
in their opposition to such an idea.
The holding of a referendum in Britain was a novelty,
and the main issue-or ostensibly the main issue--of adhesion to the E.E.C. was to a large extent obscured by a power
struggle within the Labour Party itself and by attitudes towards devolution within the United Kingdom. Eventually on
5 June the country as a whole decided by 67.2% to 32.8% (on a
64.6% poll) to adhere-but the Scottish "No" vote was significantly higher than that in England, and in Scotland, two
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electoral regions actually voted "No" by a substantial majority. Had Scotland's political and economic status within the
United Kingdom and within the Communities been determined before the referendum, many Scottish voters would
have felt more confidence in their choice. It is one thing to
reassert Scotland's traditional legal, economic and cultural ties
with Western Europe, but quite another to accept remoter
controls mediated through London. Moreover, the so-called
"Europe of the Nine" excludes Norway and Sweden which have
probably much more significance for Scotland than for England. How Mr. Wilson (or his successors) will in the future
seek to face the legal challenges of continued membership of the
Communities is for prophets rather than for lawyers.
It is not necessary, however, to peer into the crystal ball
to appreciate that, for the time being, the law-making powers
of the European Communities affect the legal systems of the
United Kingdom in a variety of ways. Some matters justiciable in British courts and in the European Court in
Luxembourg-where the present British judge, Lord Mackenzie Stuart, is from the Scottish legal profession-result
.directly from the Communities' own legislation, while in
other cases the United Kingdom Parliament is bound to give
effect to the policies of Community legislation or conventions
through British Acts of Parliament. Even such internal law
reform measures as are under active consideration-such as
the Scottish law of bankruptcy-have to take into account
E.E.C. activity in the same field. Since the leading partners in
the E.E.C. are countries of the civil law, and common lawyers
for the first time find themselves in a minority, Anglo-Saxon
attitudes in law-making may have to give way to civilian
solutions. Due to its background, Scots law should be easier to
harmonise with European solutions in the private law field
and, certainly one can envisage a progressive programme of
harmonisation in the main areas of commercial law-sale and
perhaps contract more generally, for example-a theme to
which I shall return. With this new European dimension, the
arguments for assimilating the laws of Scotland and England
may no longer be relevant in a number of contexts.
Other important constitutional changes are anticipated
which could have important consequences for Scottish law
reform-in particular the establishment of a legislature for
Scotland, for the first time since the Union of 1707. By the
Union Agreement of that year, the kingdoms of Scotland and
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England
and their respective Parliaments were superseded
by the new
State of Great Britain and the new Parliament
of
Great Britain. 5 However, although the Agreement contained
safeguards for Scots law, the organization of this new Parliament followed, on the whole, the English model. So long as
the Westminster Parliament was reluctant to legislateespecially for Scotland-unless there was obvious need for
intervention, the inconvenience of one Parliament making
laws for two legal systems was more or less tolerable, but
from about the mid 19th century successive British governments have increasingly intervened by Acts of Parliament in
all aspects of public and private law. The legislative programme is crowded, and the general attitude has been that, if
a measure is good for England, it must be good for Scotland
too. Even if the policy of reform would be good for both countries, to save Parliamentary time a measure is only too frequently drafted for Britain in English form, and Scotland is
"brought in" by a number of application provisions at the
end.
It was not, however, due to any real appreciation in London that Parliament at Westminster was not the most suitable organ for legislating on Scottish affairs which led to recent grudging proposals to establish a legislature in Scotland
for such matters. The twin phenomena of the rise of the
Scottish National Party, and the discovery of rich oil resources off the north east coast of Scotland, made rapid converts of the two large political parties at Westminster. It is
not yet clear what precisely the Labour Government's proposals for devolution and a Scottish Assembly amount to in
terms. Significantly there has been no suggestion of consulting the British people on this issue by referendum-though it
would seem to be as practicable to do so as on the Common
Market issue, and indeed might have been practicable to do
so at the same time. Neither the Royal Commission on the
Constitution,6 which reported in 1973, nor the Labour Government supported the idea of a federal solution which many
might regard as the acceptable minimum-for the altogether
unsatisfactory reason that the English do not wish a Parliament of their own while they can dominate a United Kingdom
5. T.B. Smith, The Union of 1707 as FundamentalLaw, in STUDIES CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE 1 (1962); T.B. SMITH, THE SCOTTISH DEBATE 37 (D.
MacCormick ed. 1970).
6. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, Cmnd. 5460-61 (1973).
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Parliament, and control through London of Scottish resources is deemed essential for the viability of that kingdom
as a whole.
After the June Referendum, leading "pro Marketeers" in
the Government construed the results to indicate that political expediency no longer constrained them to continue with
the proclaimed policy of establishing an effective devolution
of legislative power to a Scottish Assembly. Those Ministers
who were more astute politically-though possibly equally
unsympathetic to devolution from London-eventually prevailed after what seems to have been a hard-fought Cabinet
decision. The motives for conceding devolution are grudging,
self interested and have little to do with the well-being of
Scotland. For this reason politicians probably find the implications of ill considered promises both embarrassing and fundamentally perplexing. The package which is being prepared
is a closely guarded secret-and when opened may prove a
Pandora's box. Unlike what happened during the negotiations for the Union of 1707, leading legal institutions and
personalities have not so far been consulted by those entrusted with drafting the new constitution for Britain.
Though one alleged reason for giving Scotland a legislature is the fact that Scotland has a separate legal system, it is
very doubtful whether, at least initially, the legislative powers transferred to Scotland will be nearly as extensive as
those conferred on Louisiana within the American constitution or on the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormonth by
the Government of Ireland Act 1920. 7 Moreover, without
transfer of real power over revenue and resources-including
executive as well as legislative devolution-there could be
grave dangers that a Scottish Parliament would become a
mere "talking shop," a danger which is increased by the fact
that the Conservative Government in 1973 passed the Local
Government (Scotland) Act 8 creating regional and district
councils, on the assumption that there would be no devolution
of governmental powers to Scotland as a whole. As matters
stand, one of the new Regions established by this Act,
Strathclyde, comprises about half the population of Scotland.
Meanwhile it is envisaged that despite devolution of certain
7. 10 & 11 Geo. 5 c. 67. The powers of the Stormonth administration are,
of course, currently curbed during the state of emergency in Northern Ireland.
8. Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, c. 65.
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legislative powers to Scotland, Parliament at Westminster
will continue to legislate both for British and English matters.
Law Reform in Scotland
Clearly all concerned with law reform in Scotland will be
obliged to take into account new dimensions in the futurelooking outwards to the E.E.C. and at the potentialities of
putting the home front in order in areas where Scottish legislation is expedient. One cannot take for granted, however,
that a Scottish Parliament, if it models its procedure and
style of legislating on the Westminster House of Commons,
will have "lawyers' law" high on its list of priorities.
To what extent does Louisiana's civil law tradition stir a
quasi-religious enthusiasm in the bosom of the average
white-collar or blue-collar worker in the State or in that of
the average housewife or student outside of law school? Do
they manifest the same devotion to it as, say, their chosen
baseball team? So far as Scotland is concerned, though the
country in a sense survived the Union because of her separate legal system, and that system is part of the total cultural
heritage, the average man and woman regard certain elements in the profession of law with some reserve, while the
legal system, like a drainage system, tends to attract lay
interest mainly when it obviously works badly. The Scotsman
in the street would no doubt back Scots law against English
law for much the same reasons as he would back a Scottish
team in an international contest-but not if he thought that
he might miss out on some financial or other benefit such as a
tax concession which was offered as political attraction. Your
own present law of trusts seems to indicate similar thinking.
On the other hand, any Scottish Parliament might be
expected to contain substantially more Scots lawyers than
the Scottish legal profession's very thin representation at
Westminster. In time the legal element could become an
effective pressure group for law reform in a Scottish Parliament, although they would have to contend with those who
consider that lawyers are the natural enemies of reform and
that sociologists alone hold the nostrum for the relief of society's ills; they would also have to contend with strong commercial interests.
Pressures for assimilation of Scots and English law in the
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commercial field have been formidable since the mid 19th
century. 9 Some of this has arguably been beneficial, while in
other respects so called reform by anglicisation has clearly
been unfortunate, to state the position at its lowest. The
interaction between civil law (in the sense of private law) and
commercial law is of great importance. Commerce in a sense
knows no frontiers, and the comprehensive economic interests of nation-states comprising different types of legal
systems in their component "states," "provinces" or "countries" tend to take priority in the legal domain. Thus, of the
"mixed systems," probably South Africa alone would be
theoretically free to restructure her commercial law on basically civilian lines-though this seems a most unlikely development for historical and practical reasons. As is well
known, the federal or national law of the United States may
have repercussions in the commercial field notwithstanding
the Louisiana Civil Code and State legislation. Similarly in
Quebec the civil law may have to give way to federal law in
the commercial field; the economic interests of Canada as a
whole take priority. The respective limits of civil and commercial law are not, however, easy to define; there seems to
be an inexorable principle that where central power can extend its influence at the expense of a local civil law by invoking jurisdiction over commercial matters, that power will be
extended.
If this is the case in Louisiana and Quebec which have
their civil codes and State or Provincial legislatures, it is
readily understandable that in a unitary state such as Britain
with two legal systems and one Parliament for both, Scotland's opportunities for securing reform of the law in the
areas of, say, corporeal moveable property and obligations,
confront formidable difficulties. These difficulties are not
eliminated by the probability that the reforms proposed
would accord more closely with the solutions of neighbouring
civil law states-though it would be rash oversimplification to
imply that this would always be so. Who can say what the
political future holds regarding the United Kingdom and the
European Communities? Two things at least are sure: first, in
legal negotiations in the Communities, the United Kingdom
will seek to maintain the maximum influence of English law;
9. See J. Gow, MERCANTILE AND INDUSTRIAL LAW OF SCOTLAND (1964).
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and secondly, that a separate effective presentation of Scotland's position cannot be envisaged in the present system.
For the avoidance of doubt, however, it should be made
clear that there is no ill will between the peoples of Scotland
and England-though there may from time to time be resentment against the insensitivity and complacency of some
elements in a London-based or controlled bureaucracy and
political machinery.
Legislative Devolution
Those responsible for law reform in Scotland would not be
using time and resources wisely by planning for the consequences of more than limited legislative devolution-falling
short of a federal solution. The safeguards for our legal system provided by the skeletal written constitution of 1707 have
proved inadequate. Whatever the extent of devolution which
is eventually conceded to Scotland, considerable thought will
have to be given to the problems of how possible conflicts
between the powers of Westminster and Whitehall on the one
hand, and a Scottish legislature and administration on the
other, can be resolved. The present unsatisfactory state of
the relationship in legal matters between London and Edinburgh and of the legislative machine was scrutinised and
criticised in a trenchant address by the Chairman of the
Scottish Law Commission, Lord Hunter, in the spring of 1975
shortly after the Fourth Tucker Lecture had been delivered.' 0
In its published form this address not only identifies present
difficulties in the operating of the legislative machine but
sign-posts at least by implication their aggravation in a situation of devolution. As yet no one can predict with confidence
how or by whom control will be exercised over potential
conflicts between the powers of the Westminster Parliament
and the Scottish Assembly-in which, party alignments may
well not correspond with each other.
The respective roles of legislature and administration are
not the same in Britain as in the United States, but in the
context of devolution it may be hoped that in Britain as in the
United States the Judiciary will be entrusted with the ultimate policing of competing legislatures-rather than resort10. Lord Hunter, Scotland's Law: The Legislative Machine, 1975 S.L.T.
(News) 121.
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ing to the crude (and politically hazardous method) of allowing the central executive to exercise an ultimate veto in legislative form. At all events, one urgent problem to be solved
when devolution comes in Britain is how legislative powers
reflecting two different basic legal traditions can be harmonised.
Another problem of legislative devolution may well be if
legal reforms are accepted by international convention or are
required within the structure of the E.E.C., but the legislative implementation of the policy of these reforms is left to
states bound by the international obligation to determine
how and to what extent such implementation could be left in
Scottish hands? What, moreover, would result if an internal
proposal for Scottish law reform represented a policy which
corresponded to a continental pattern but was unacceptable
to English lawyers? Certainly foreign affairs would be reserved in the United Kingdom to the central government, but
in practice it is not the Foreign Office but certain important
Whitehall Departments which formulate policy regarding
proposed international agreements on such matters as protection of bona fide acquirers of real rights over moveables,
penalty clauses in contracts, "products liability" and so forth.
If the Departments advising the Foreign Office opposed particular solutions on an international level, is it likely that
they would remain inactive if the same solutions were proposed by Scottish law reform agencies as reforms in Scottish
domestic law?
"Law" and the Executive
One must stress the relevance of an expanding and powerful centralised executive as a potential curb on what in a
very loose sense could be called "lawyer's law." In fact, virtually no reform measure--even
of clarification
and
restatement-is without social, economic or political implications of some kind. Any agency proposing law reform measures has, if its proposals are to succeed, necessarily to find
support from the executive--especially the very experienced
permanent bureaucrats who have their own esprit de corps.
Lord Justice Scarman's Hamlyn Lectures' make clear that
the former Chairman of the Law Commission (for England
and Wales) is deeply concerned with the relationship between
11. L. SCARMAN, ENGUSH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION (1975).
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the law which lawyers regard as their proper domain and the
executive. Marcel Berlins wrote
Cassandra's punishment was to be disbelieved when she
correctly prophesied the gloomy future of her society.
Lord Justice Leslie Scarman has taken the risk of assuming that mantle. Sir Leslie's argument is that if the
influence of law and the rule of law continue to decline,
the administrative authorities will become dominant.
Control over their decisions will be exercised by the Government itself, not by the Courts. There would be no
effective way for the12citizen to challenge governmental or
administrative acts.
Sir Leslie himself observed
To satisfy the conscience of the nation the state has had
to move into the empty spaces of the law, the deserts and
hill country left uncultivated by distributive justice, and
there to make provision for society as a whole .... Thus
the welfare state is challenging the relevance, or at least
the adequacy of the common law's concepts and classifications. Fault, trespass, property, even marriage are
now seen to be an insecure base for the development of a
13
law suited to the needs of our society.
So much from the cradle of the "common law." Sir Leslie's reflections on the E.E.C. depend-as do mine-on imponderables. He seems almost to pronounce a viaticum over the
private law which has been cherished by civil lawyer and
common lawyer alike. Lord Justice Scarman calls on English
lawyers for a radically new way of thinking, concentrating on
new sources and fields of law. How this could curb the administrative juggernaut is not clear. I accept that in some
fields fault liability may be superseded by insurance, that in
certain circumstances a public authority may be a necessary
substitute for parental responsibility and that in some cases
the consumer on credit needs protection from exploitation,
and so forth. Of course I believe in social justice-but not in
hirsute social workers under every bed; sociologists in places
of judges on the bench; and the regulation of each detail of
work and leisure by an anonymous administrative machine.
My desire is for good law: from too many laws, good Lord
12. London Times, Dec. 14, 1974.
13. L. SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION 70 (1975).
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deliver us. Planning law, laws protecting the environment,
regulating the economy and providing for social welfare are
necessary aspects of modern society. Such laws affect all aspects of daily life, but they often bear as little relation to law in
the jurist's sense as does a railway timetable bear to a work of
literature. 4 It is obvious that public health--control of
epidemics, the ensuring of sound water supply and drainage
system, and so forth-is vital to the community. However, this
public domain does not oust the surgeon and physician from the
more traditional concern with patients entrusted to their
professional skill and care. May there not be an analogy with
the various functions of law and lawyers in society today?
Scarman Proposals
Lord Justice Scarman's proposals for the country's ills
are largely based on the Law Commissions which should be
specifically requested to conduct a feasibility study of a programme to move the law from its present basis to a statutory
basis-a code or set of interlocking codes-and should consider the implications of statutory drafting and interpretation in going over to a law grounded on statute. He would
propose inter alia1 5 a new constitutional settlement enacted
by Parliament after consultation with the judges, nationalist
interests, trade unionists and others; the establishment of
entrenched provisions (including a Bill of Rights) and restraints upon administrative and legislative power, protecting it from attack by a bare Parliamentary majority as at
present. He also favoured the establishment of a Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom with the duty of protecting the
Constitution including the powers of legislatures established
by devolution from Westminster. Special attention should be
given to problems of codification and reform especially in
relation to administrative law. A number of these proposals
appear admirable. The pivot of his very ambitious scheme
which has implications for the United Kingdom as a whole
seems to be the Law Commission (for England and Wales) and
the Scottish Law Commission. However, regretfully, I doubt
whether the Law Commissions even in collaboration-at least
as staffed, financed and constituted as at present-are really
capable of coping with all Sir Leslie's projects. We in Edin14. LORD COOPER, SELECTED PAPERS 174 (1957).
15. L. SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION 76 (1975).
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burgh tend to have our feet on the ground and to tackle
feasible objectives within our somewhat limited resources.
Scottish Law Commission

Now I wish to speak from the viewpoint of a Commissioner of the Scottish Law Commission-indeed as its only
foundation member still serving. A professor in his closet may
disregard the harsh realities and uncertainties of life, and
plan great reforms according to his vision. Such is not the
role of myself or of my four colleagues nor of the Scottish Law
Commission's supporting legal staff. We are not jurisprudential monks-nor again have we political power to carry our
proposals into effect. The first Chairman of the Scottish Law
Commission, Lord Kilbrandon, who now sits as one of the two
Scottish judges in the House of Lords, summarised our functions under the Law Commissions Act 1965, succinctly as
follows:
The general duty of the Commissions is to take and keep
under review the law of their respective countries with a
view to its systematic development and reform. We are
directed to consider, among other things, the possibilities
of codification, the elimination of anomalies, the repeal of
obsolete and unnecessary enactments, and in general the
simplification and modernisation of the law. We have to
receive and consider, in addition, any proposals from
whatever source, for the reform of the law which may be
made or referred to us. Our functions may be described
under two heads. First, we have to prepare and submit to
the Government, from time to time, programmes for the
examination of different branches of the law, with a view
to reform. After these programmes have been approved,
it is our duty to prepare the background work leading to
legislation, or to submit draft bills prepared by ourselves.
Secondly, it is our duty to provide advice and information
to Government Departments and other authorities or
bodies who may be concerned in the amendment of any
18
branch of the law.
The statute creating the Scottish Law Commission and
the Law Commission (for England and Wales) requires them
16. Lord Kilbrandon, The Scottish Law Commission, 2 GA. L. REV. 194-95
(1968).
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to obtain information on the legal systems of other countries
likely to facilitate performance of their functions; and also, in
the exercise of their functions, to consult with each other.
Though matters -which give rise to social, political or
economic controversy (e.g., no-fault liability or constitutional
devolution) are likely to be referred to an ad hoc Royal Commission or Departmental Committee with a wide spectrum of
membership, we have in fact had remitted to us certain socially controversial matters-such as divorce law reform and
liability for ante-natal injury. On the whole it is with the
traditional categories of the law that the two Law Commissions in Britain-commissions of lawyers only-are concerned, and within the Scottish Commission my particular
areas of primary responsibility are Obligations and Corporeal
Moveable Property which in Scots law are basically civilian in
content.
The remainder of this article is confined to the traditional
areas of the civil law with which the Scottish Law Commission is at present concerned; very relevant to these reflections are the three Tucker Civil Law Lectures 17 which have
already been delivered and also two papers published recently in the Louisiana Law Review. These are Colonel Tucker's Au-delh du Code Civil, Mais Par le Code Civil"'and A
Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana19 by Justice Barham of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
20
Professor Zepos in his lecture The Legacy of Civil Law

has demonstrated convincingly that that legacy, though
mediated through codification, has also been transmitted
otherwise. Professor Jacques Vanderlinden of Brussels has
also traced the elusive definition of "a code" in his impressive
thesis Le Concept de Code en Europe Occidentale du XIIIe au
XIX e Si cle. 21 Scots law, like the Roman-Dutch systems, has
not been codified-and I shall touch on the prospects of its
codification. Professor Ren6 David doubts the wisdom of attempting again at this time the general revision of the Code
Civil-but contemplates the practicability of separating the
law of obligations and commercial law from the rest of the
17. See articles cited at note 1, supra.
18. 34 LA. L. REv. 957 (1974).
19. 33 LA. L. REv. 357 (1973).
20. 34 LA. L. REv. 895 (1974).
21. J. VANDERLINDEN, LE CONCEPT DE CODE EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE
DU XIIP AU XIX* SItCLE (1967).

1975]

LAW REFORM IN SCOTLAND

Code as has been done in Switzerland. Early unification of
law in these areas is anticipated in implementation of E.E.C.
policy. Professor Cr~peau, President of the Commission for
the revision of the Civil Code of Quebec sees his task as
re-vision,2 2 and a number of the new developments which he
contemplates will doubtless be grafted on to most enlightened
civilian systems even if not onto their civil codes. The Code
for Quebec, as I think the Louisiana Code and our own uncodified system in Scotland as stated in the institutional writers,
are prized as symbols of our separate cultural identities as
well as for jurisprudential reasons. But law must react to
social and economic change. Our clients and our fellow citizens care little for our private devotion to a traditional tree,
however deep its roots, unless it grows acceptable fruit for
contemporary consumption. I must confess also my shameless
green-eyed envy of the encouragement given by Executive
and Legislative alike in Quebec and Louisiana to the comprehensive proposals of law reform agencies in these jurisdictions.
As we shall see, the two Law Commissions in Britain find
that the actual legislative enactment of their proposals can
create unresolved problems. The problems of oil and gas law
are new to Britain, and, though the oilfields already discovered are off the Scottish coast, London has so far maintained control of the law relating to its exploitation. The
civilian approach to these problems as expanded by John
Tucker may become relevant if eventually Scotland assumes
control. At present on the level of obligations, AngloAmerican styles prevail-often with references to arbitration
in London or according to the laws of an American commonlaw state. This infiltration of common law techniques cannot,
however, avail where real rights such as servitudes are concerned, and I await with interest the reactions of some oil
exploiters when the right to run pipes under land is challenged by a singular successor of the original grantor of a
contractual "wayleave."
The Scottish Law Commission formulates proposals in
Programmes submitted to the Lord Advocate, and, once they
are approved, no one can stop us working on these and reporting publicly--except indirectly by flooding us with other ur22. Crepeau, Civil Code Revision in Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 921, 931
(1974).
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gent work. Among the matters which we have undertaken at
our own request are Judicial Precedent, Obligations in general, Exemption Clauses in Contracts, Prescription, Title to
Corporeal Moveables and Security Rights over them, Family
Law, Succession and Capacity of Minors and Pupils. Our
Third Programme 2 --the most recent-is concerned with Private International Law matters mainly arising from European Economic Community Conventions or Hague Conference proposals-most of which have a civil law element. As
our Annual Reports show we have made steady rather than
spectacular progress in these fields-one of our most successful achievements being in the reform of the law of prescription.
At the outset, so far as our First Programme 24 was concerned, we were in a state of enthusiastic innocence--our
main worry probably being the very limited manpower and
resources at our disposal compared with our English opposite
numbers. We consoled ourselves with the quip that they had
much more to reform in their law than we did in ours-a
somewhat foolish quip, admittedly, when there was clearly so
much to do. We envisaged that we would prepare Memoranda
for consultation-identifying the area for reform, analysing
the existing law and comparative solutions and indicating our
provisional conclusions. Then, in due course, after full consultation, a Report would be prepared with draft clauses, and we
trusted that our proposals would be duly implemented in
legislation. We had no illusions that thorough preparation
and consultation would take a lot of time. Instant law reform
is almost ex hypothesi bad. Well, some of our work progressed
propitiously and other aspects were to labour in troubled
waters.
Precedent
In Scots law a limited doctrine of the binding single precedent has operated since about the mid 19th century, but is
always qualified in Scotland by the rule that a single judge
cannot prescribe a precedent and by the principle that the
highest courts sitting in Scotland are in theory collegiate and
can set aside a precedent which is later considered unsound.
However, in civil matters only, an appeal lies from the Scot23. SCOT. LAW COM. No. 29 (1973).
24. SCOT. LAW COM. No. 1 (1965).
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tish Courts to the House of Lords where it had been held, in
an English appeal in 1898, that the House was absolutely
bound by its own precedents. Whether this doctrine of inescapable infallibility applied to Scottish appeals had never
been decided. The Scottish Law Commission recommended
that legislation should make clear that it did not-and it was
agreed with our English opposite numbers that, if they so
wished, they should recommend that the relevant Bill should
extend to England. In July 1966 the result was achieved in
respect of all House of Lords appeals by a different procedure, 25 which originated, however, from our proposal. Though
we retain Judicial Precedent on our Programme for further
consideration, the appropriate time will probably be when we
have to consider the doctrine in relation to draft codification.
A further problem will be the relation between judicial precedent and the works of our institutional writers such as Stair,
Erskine and Bell which Madame Hel~ne David in her Introduction & l'Etude du Droit Pcossais26 aptly described as having an authority comparable in ecclesiastical terms to that of
the Fathers of the Church. Further, she rightly discerns that
these works might well have been the basis for codification of
Scots law but for the Union with England. That foundation
for codification remains a potent source of law at present and
for any future codification comprehending Obligations and
Moveable Property.
It is unlikely that we shall express in the immediate
future any further views on the virtues or defects of judicial
precedent. There is, for example, the question of multiple
judicial opinions in appellate courts. A distinguished former
member of the Law Commission (for England and Wales),
Vice Chancellor Gower, has criticised strongly the practice of
the House of Lords of delivering a series of lengthy speeches
(i.e., 'opinions') in appeals, instead of a single speech specifying the grounds of decision. 27 Only too often an appeal is
decided by a 3:2 majority for divergent reasons. On the other
hand Lord Reid (the Scottish judge who for many years presided over the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords and
25. See Note, 83 L.Q.R. 176 (1967).
26. H. DAVID, INTRODUCTION A L'tTUDE DU DROIT ]tCOSSAIS 305 (Paris
1972). On the relationship between institutional authority and precedent, see
T.B. Smith, Authors and Authority, 12 J.S.P.T.L. (N.S.) 3 (1972).
27. Gower, Reflections on Law Reform, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 257, 258 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Gower].
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who died shortly after retiring this year at the age of eightyfour after twenty-six years service as Lord of Appeal in Ordinary) strongly supported the value of having several
speeches (opinions) by judges in deciding important appeals. 28
Admittedly Lord Reid also considered that the expenses of
House of Lords appeals should be met from public funds-but,
even so, his preference for multiple speeches does not seem
calculated to promote clarity in the law, though it may be of
help to those who wish on a future occasion to reverse the
majority's conclusion or give judges in lower courts more
room for manoeuvre. The fundamental problem facing the
British Law Commissions concerns the relation between precedent and codification. The views of Justice Barham on the
judicial role in construing code provisions in relation to case
law have interested me greatly. 29 Within the European civilian systems there is considerable divergence in practice.
One of the outstanding books published in our times is
Dawson's Oracles of the Law; 30 I felt that he failed to emphasise sufficiently the fundamental concern with "the law"
in the sense of a written provision which constitutes the point
of departure in the codified civilian systems.3 1 He has particular praise for the modern German approach to judicial
development of the law-which he concludes is not dissimilar
to that of the United States, though cooperation between
legal scholarship and the judiciary is not so close in America
as in Germany. Dawson holds that
Now emancipated at last from excessive control of Roman
law and Romanists, or Pandektists, and from the conceptual structure of the B.G.B. the development of German
law is safe in the hands of judges who, though "learned
men" themselves and supported by established legal scholarship, use and have used advanced case law techniques
32
to develop the law.
He contrasts the position in France where, though the
judges-especially in the highest courts--have disclaimed law
making powers, they have in fact assumed it by adopting a
28. Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J.S.P.T.L. (N.S.) 22, 28-29 (1972).
29. Barham, A Renaissance of the CivilianTradition in Louisiana,33 LA.
L. REV. 357, 366 (1973).
30. J. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968).

31. T.B. Smith, Book Review, 82 HARV. L. REV. 490 (1968).
32. J. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 490 (1968).
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cryptic style of opinion writing whose main purpose was to
prove their dutiful submission, but which left them in fact
more free.
To the extent that judges abstain from candid disclosure,
the load is cast on others, outsiders [i.e., commentators];
being outsiders they must search out clues, speculate,
surmise. This is the posture of French legal science,
through the tradition that inhibits French courts in
exploiting the modern resources of the reasoned opin33
ion.
It is well worth noting that very recently the Procureur
G~n~ralpr'es la Court de Cassation and Professor Andre Tunc
of the University of Paris have-citing the practice of
Louisiana-urged that French judgments should be more
4
explicitly reasoned.3
Code Law and Ca8e Law
The relation between code and precedent has greatly concerned the two British Law Commissions-though the occasion for actual resolution of the problem has not yet come.
Judicial precedent in some form is an indispensable device in
law making-but a rigid doctrine of stare decisis is intolerable
in any viable legal system. My personal view is that the
decisions of higher courts and of the higher judges are of
importance-basically second only to the code itself-in any
mature system. The higher the degree of generality in the
code-the greater the role of the judicial interpreter. However, "the law" rather than judicial interpretation must in
the end prevail. This is one of our particular problems in
Britain. The Acts of the pre-Union Scottish Parliaments deliberately left to the judges a creative role, and one of our
outstanding jurists, Mackenzie, in the 17th century could
33. Id. at 430-41.
34. Touffait & Tune, Pour une motivationplus explicite des d&ision de
justice notamment de celles de la cour de cassation (1974) REV. TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 487, 492; see Oppenheim, To What Extent Are
Judicial Decisions and Legal .Writings Sources of Law?, in LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, 7

(Hazard & Wagner eds. 1974). See also THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND
DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS (J. Dainow ed. 1974).
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justifiably write: 35 "The easiest and plainest Part of our law
are our statutes."
By contrast, the English tradition-which has now
seeped into Scotland in construing British legislation-is that
legislation is an encroachment on the common law, and therefore to be grudgingly and narrowly construed. Accordingly
the draftsman of legislation resorts to a technique3 8 which is
often incomprehensible to the ordinary man and is wearisome
for court and counsel. Were any code to be drafted as are
current statutes, or to be construed according to English
notions, reform would be in large measure frustrated.
There is an added factor of difficulty when a code aims at
reforming and unifying the laws of Scotland and England in
an area where one system derives from the civil law and the
other is of common law provenance. It would seem that codification in Franco/British (English) form can probably be
effective-as witness the projected Seychelles reform37 -but
only if the relation between codification and judicial law making has been first resolved. In a situation where Scottish law
and English law are to be codified, it seems to me that the
code must necessarily exclude reference to pre-code case law,
which would have different jurisprudential and doctrinal
bases in the two systems, and that the gloss of subsequent
case law should not obscure the precedence of the enacted
code.
Codification
No Tucker Civil Law Lecture could be envisaged without
some mention of the merits of codification. Reform by codification was expressly prescribed by the Law Commissions
Act 1965. Since the Scottish Law Commission had selected
reform of the, law of Obligations in its First Programme and
the English Commission had selected reform of the law of
Contract, it was assumed that this provided a splendid opportunity to codify contractual obligations on a Great Britain
basis. I was involved in this exercise from the outset until the
Scottish Law Commission withdrew from it and, as a serving
35. SIR GEORGE MACKENZIE OF ROSEHAUGH, OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACT
OF PARLIAMENT 1621 AGAINST BANKRUPTS 1.

36. Gower at 264-65 n.27. Cf. REPORT OF RENTON COMMITTEE ON PREPARATION OF LEGISLATION (1975).

37. Chloros, The Projected Reform of the Civil Law of the Seychelles, 48
TUL. L. REV. 815 (1974).
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Commissioner, protocol precludes me from twitching aside
the veil of confidentiality and revealing Truth starkly naked.
However, my former opposite number of the English Commission, Professor Gower who is now Vice Chancellor of Southampton University, is more free to expose her to a modest
extent. I shall quote from an article published by him in the
University of Toronto Law Journal and if I comment on his
text this cannot be regarded as breaching confidence. My
good friend the Vice Chancellor observed:
Another painful lesson that we learnt-and this certainly
has relevance in the Canadian context-is that the
difficulties of law reform are enormously increased if one
is attempting to unify or harmonize two or more systems
of law with different traditions, such as the common law
and the civil law. We faced this in our joint projects with
the Scottish Law Commission-notably in relation to our
proposed codification of the law of contract. This project
seems to me immensely worthwhile; at a time when we
are going into Europe surely we should unify the contract
laws of our small island, for the law of contract is the
basis of commercial law? We embarked on it with goodwill
and enthusiasm on both sides; but at present as a joint
enterprise it has run into the ground. The difficulties
have not arisen because the English and the Scots disagree on results, but because we speak different legal languages and arrive at the results by a different process of
reasoning. And to those trained in the more philosophical
'civilian' school the process of reasoning is more sacred
than it is to the common lawyer. If I may give an example: both we and the Scots agreed that, in certain circumstances at any' rate, a unilateral promise not supported by consideration should be enforceable-as indeed
it already is in both systems. I wanted to achieve this by
defining a contract so that it would include such promises. But my opposite number on the Scottish Law Commission would have none of that. A pollicitatio, he said,
was an enforceable voluntary obligation but it was not a
contract and to pretend that it was would sap the very
foundations of sound principle. To me that did not matter
so long as we achieved the desired result; to him it was
unthinkable. These differences in thought processes and
vocabulary make unification extraordinarily difficult
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even if the difficulties are not further aggravated, as they
were in our case, by the difference in place of the two
bodies and by the inevitable fear that the legal system of
the majority would swamp that of the minority. Despite
these difficulties a first draft of a Uniform Code has been
completed by the Law Commission, but not one which is
acceptable to the Scottish commissioners. 38
From an English viewpoint that is a fair enough statement, though it should not be assumed that the joint
English-Scottish team differed only regarding questions of
presentation, nor that in matters of substance views were
necessarily divided on national lines. I would perhaps question Dr. Gower's priorities regarding unification of British
contract law before entering the E.E.C., since harmonization
with the majority might involve precisely the same conceptual difficulties for English lawyers as in dealing with Scottish lawyers but with English law in the minority vote. Actual formal presentation did, of course, raise fundamental
differences of approach-the English school favoring "codification" in a style resembling the American Restatement,
and the Scots on the whole favoring a style comparable with
that of the Quebec or Louisiana Codes. I can in all honesty
assert that there was little if any chauvinism among the
representatives of the minority (i.e., the Scottish system) but
there was a preference for civilian solutions. I doubt whether
anyone who had not been closely concerned with a joint exercise such as that described by Dr. Gower has any real appreciation of the extent to which the doctrine of consideration
has crept into the interstices of the English law of contract.
One of the first appointments to the English Commission
was Dr. Andrew Martin Q.C., an able commercial lawyer in
busy practice who had been associated with Mr. Gerald Gardiner Q.C. (later Lord Chancellor Gardiner) as joint author of
Law Reform Now. 39 Dr. Martin has been trained in the European legal tradition as well as in English law, and I myself
had studied and practiced both Scots law and English law.
Having the advantage-or disadvantage--of being legally
bilingual we were near despair whenever unilateral obligations (in the civilian sense) and unilateral contracts (in the
common law sense), came up for discussion. Nor were these
38. Gower at 264-65 and note 25.
39. G. GARDENER & A. MARTIN, LAW REFORM Now (1963).
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the only topics on which there was misunderstanding rather
than disagreement. The misleading approximation of "void"
and "voidable" in common law contract law with absolute and
relative nullity in the civil law 40 is another source of mutual
bewilderment. When it is said-as it often is said-that, apart
from consideration, third party rights and specific implement
(anglice "specific performance"), there is no great difference
between the Scottish and English law of contract, the statement overlooks the fact that most western systems agree
generally on the results which the law should achieve, but
may differ greatly as to the techniques whereby these ends
are to be achieved.
Especially in the honeymoon period when the two permanent Commissions had just been established by statute,
there was enormous good will between the Scottish and English Commissioners. We regarded our opposite numbers as
personal friends--not just as professional counterparts. If
warmth of friendship could have fused two systems of voluntary obligations into a draft code we should have succeeded.
Di8 aliter vi8um.
The Scottish position is summarised in the Scottish Law
Commission's Seventh Annual Report:
While recognizing that considerable advances had been
made by our participation, in joint discussions on the Codification of the Law of Contract we were becoming increasingly concerned at the area of disagreement that
still existed on fundamental issues. Although a joint
meeting was held in October 1971 to try to resolve the
disagreements we continued to have reservations on the
proposed structure of the Code, the method of its preparation and presentation, and the' consequences it would
have on our aim to secure beneficial harmonisation for
Scots law. We have withdrawil from the exercise. 41
The unavailing effort to combine reform in detail of two
divergent systems simultaneously with unifying codification
had taught us all lessons of value. Both the (English) Law
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission intend meanwhile to circulate independently-though in consultation
with each other-Memoranda or Working Papers on particu40. R. DAVID, LES CONTRATS EN DROIT ANGLAIS 180 (1973).
41. SCOT. LAW COM. No. 28 par. 16.
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lar aspects of the law of voluntary obligations or contracts to
elicit, as is customary, the views of those most experienced
and concerned. As I see it, the main English problem concerns the ramifications of the doctrine of consideration and
the main Scottish problems probably concern the law of evidence-but many more problems have been identified as a
result of the joint exercise which is now at an end. One may
forecast that the English reforms will draw extensively on
American and British Commonwealth materials, while Scottish reforms will take account of European, Quebec,
Louisiana and South African solutions as well. Eventually,
after a number of statutory reforms of the law of obligations
in each system and after considering European perspectives,
it may be thought appropriate ultimately to codify at least
the law of Voluntary Obligations and Unjustified Enrichment.
From what has been stated earlier in this article-about
Britain's relationship to the European Communities and
about the extent of devolution of legislative powers to Scotland-it is impossible at present to determine the wisest
policy for ultimate reform or codification of contract law.
One reason at least for not codifying Scottish criminal
law has been that the pressures to accept the English semicodifying criminal law statutes would have been formidable.
Yet we have probably more control over our criminal law
than over other branches of law. Within the present political
framework of Great Britain it is almost impossible to envisage separate codification of the Scottish law of contractespecially if the English put forward a version of their own. It
may be that if we remain in the E.E.C., the United Kingdom
may in time have to adopt unifying continental style codes at
least for commercial contracts-which could provide more
satisfactory solutions from the viewpoint of the Scots lawyer
than of the English lawyer. At present the Departments of
Trade, of Prices and Consumer Protection, of Industry and of
Energy-all Whitehall Departments with no Scottish legal
element-exercise effective control over British trade and
industry. They claim to dictate policy on Scottish commercial
law, and, if one excepts contracts in respect of land, all contract law can by sophisticated argument be subsumed under
the category "commercial" and therefore be controlled from
London.
The Department of Trade and Industry-as it was then

1975]

LAW REFORM IN SCOTLAND

designated-argued before the Royal Commission on the Constitution that economic efficiency required retention in
Whitehall (London) of control over commercial law, and that
serious inconvenience would be caused if devolution resulted
in substantial disparities in that law on different sides of the
Anglo-Scottish border. Their evidence was seemingly accepted by the Royal Commission (presided over by Lord Kilbrandon who had been the first Chairman of the Scottish Law
Commission) whose 1973 report asserted
Any disparities in the law regarding industry and commerce in different parts of a single market area are inconvenient and damaging to efficiency .

.

. and there is

recognition on both sides of the border that opportunity
should be taken where possible to remove them. Thus we
observe from the annual reports of the Law Commissions
that a draft code of the law of contract, for application
throughout the United Kingdom, has for some time been
in preparation. There is a tendency internationally to
move towards the adoption of uniform codes in several
commercial fields so as to facilitate international trade,
and the policies of the Department of Trade and Industry
will in the future be developed within a European
framework. This group of the Department's functions
42
would therefore offer little scope for devolution.
What I find unacceptable is the assumption that not only
policy but the manner of its implementation for Scotland
should be denied to Scottish organs of government.
I cannot leave the topic of codification of voluntary obligations without noting two further matters of significancethe problem of the actual enactment of a code such as we
envisaged and the related problem of hostility among influential members of the legal profession to the whole idea. Vice
Chancellor Gower has again obliged me by lifting the veil to a
modest extent. He observed
[S]ince reforms will be implemented, if at all, by legislation, it is essential that the Commission should have a
close relation with the legislative process. This has two
facets, the first of which was realised by those who estab42. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, Cmnd. 5460-61, par. 723
(1973).
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lished the Law Commission, the second of which I think
43
was not clearly foreseen.
The first facet concerned the drafting of legislation to
implement the recommendations of a Law Commission. Dr.
Gower is concerned with the position in England which is
rather different from that of the Scottish Law Commissionbut, of course, affects that Commission where "joint exercises"
such as those on contract law and exemption clauses. The
English draftsmen-"parliamentary counsel"--tend to take
the view that they alone have the right to determine how any
policy shall be expressed in statutory language and claim to
be answerable only to the Prime Minister. Mr. Commissioner
Gower, as he then was, was told by -a former head of the
British Civil Service: "You'll never achieve anything; the parliamentary counsel will defeat you." Gower was, however, a
man of exceptional gifts of heart and mind and he recorded of
his Commission's dealings with these experts: "Up to the time
when I left I think that I can say that we had won more
battles than we had lost-but the war still continues." Since
he forbore to disclose the war map on the Contracts exercise I
can only leave you to infer how it would have struck the
draftsmen of, for example, the Code Napol6on or of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
The second facet of the legislative problem which no one
really foresaw and which no one has yet solved is how legislation such as a code could be enacted in Britain. The Vice
Chancellor commented
In most of the countries of the New Commonwealth this
is no problem; if the Government backs the bill it goes
through like a dose of salts. Not so in the Old Commonwealth; certainly not in the case of the United Kingdom
44
Parliament.
It is, of course, true that if a Government with a majority
wishes to use three line whips and march its troops through
the lobbies like sheep, legislation can be forced through in
quick time and without much discussion. The European
Communities Act 1972 which was of enormous constitutional
importance was carried through somewhat in this manner. It
would, however, be unthinkable that the United Kingdom
Parliament would enact a Codification of Obligations Bill43. Gower at 260. Cf. REPORT OF RENTON COMMTTEE ON PREPARATION
OF LEGISLATION (1975).

44. Gower at 261.
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say of three clauses with the Code itself as a Schedule. There
would be a veritable field day for the lawyers in both Houses
of Parliament and every law Member who had ever made a
bad bargain would have his amendments to propose.
The Law Commissions' proposal to codify the law of Contract-in the case of the Scottish Commission as part of a
more comprehensive project to codify Obligations-was not
greeted with an enthusiastic response from the practicing
profession. It is fair to observe that few people were very
clear as to what exactly was envisaged, but early drafts were
circulated for comment to a cross section of experienced and
influential lawyers. The general English legal attitude to codification-unless semi-codification of the existing common
law-is not encouraging. Lord Reid, the Scottish judge who
became the ageless oracle of the English common law, was at
first opposed to codification-but later modified his views to
"proof before answer." In his Maccabaean Lecture "The Law
and the Reasonable Man" delivered before the British
Academy in 1968 he commented
It is a delusion that codification will bring about any
substantial saving. A competent counsel can find the relevant cases very quickly, and it would be folly to encourage people to rely on a code if they did not know the
45
background.
However, when I was President of the Society of Public
Teachers of Law of Britain and Ireland I persuaded Lord
Reid to come to an Edinburgh meeting in 1971 and address
the Society on "The Judge as Law Maker." On this occasion
he said
I must confess that I distrust codification, but I am willing to be convinced that I am wrong. The Law Commissions may make a success of it. Let us wait and see. ...
What we shall do if we are forced into the Common Market and have to deal with Continental legislation and
decisions I just do not know. We shall have to learn a lot
about not only European law but more important about
the habits of mind of European lawyers, which I suspect
46
are more theoretical and less practical than our own.

Well, forced in we have been now, and Community law is
a "growth industry" in British law schools today. Lord Den45. 54 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITIsH ACADEMY 194 (1968).

46. 12 J.S.P.T.L. (N.S.) 22, 27-28 (1972).
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ning M.R., who might not be offended by the sobriquet "the
dons' delight" has pronounced on the impact (of the Treaty
of Rome) on English law as follows:
But when we come to matters with a European element,
the treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back. Parliament has decreed that the treaty is henceforth to be part
47
of our law.
A somewhat unexpected assault on the idea of codifying the
law of contract came in 1967 from a scholar of great versatility, my good friend Professor H. R. Hahlo, then Professor of
Law at the University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa)
and now Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at
McGill University (Canada). An authority on Anglo-American
common law and the uncodified Roman-Dutch law, he has
more recently been active in connection with the revision of
the Quebec Civil Code. Under the somewhat emotive rubric
"Here lies the Common Law" he wrote of the British Law
Commissions' codification project:
Acting within the letter and spirit of its mandate the
Commission is taking the bull by the horns by embarking
upon an extensive scheme of codification. High on the list
of its projects stands the codification of the general part
of the law of contract.., which is inextricably mixed up
with the law governing special contracts, torts and "restitution." By tackling the "truly enormous task" of the
codification of contract, the Law Commission has nailed
the flag of wholesale codification of private law and, possibly, the commercial law as well, to its mast. In any case,
once there are comprehensive codes of the law of the
family and the law of obligations there is not much of
48
private law left.
47. Bulmer v. Bollinger [1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, 1231.
48. 30 MODERN L. R. 241, 242 (1967). See also his replications Codifying
the Common Law ProtractedGestation,38 MODERN L. R. 23 (1975), which does
not take into account Gower's article, nor sufficiently the fact which the
learned author probably underestimated that the exercise which he criticised
originally was not to codify the English common law alone. Indeed on Gower's account the English Commission might have been reasonably satisfied
with the completed draft. Vanderlinden and Topping (now deceased) had
given more weight to the European factors--which remain imponderables.
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In Dr. Hahlo's opinion the differences between Scots and
English law were not of such magnitude as to justify the
"heavy guns of codification" nor were there other grounds
justifying this step. This article in the Modern Law Review
attracted rejoinders from the redoubtable Mr. Commissioner
Gower, 49 from Professor Vanderlinden (now of Brussels) and
from the late Mr. Topping of Edinburgh. The latters' joint
contribution published in 1970 is appropriately entitled "Ibi
Renascit Jus Commune." They conclude
When the hic jacet or rather the ci-git-has been inscribed over the policies of General de Gaulle, and Britain
has joined the European Communities, the laws of an
enlarged community will inevitably converge; the codification of English law will be a birth rather than a
death: the birth (the rebirth a Scots lawyer would wish to
say) of a common law of Europe. Ibi renascit jus commune.5°
It is an interesting but sombre reflection that all concerned as outsiders or insiders with the British Commissions'
project for codification of contract have, to a greater or lesser
extent, misappreciated the situation which would develop-and
also that, in the last resort, political rather than doctrinal
factors will probably prevail.
I confess to having been enthusiastic for the idea of
codifying the Law of Obligations in 1965-but in the light of
subsequent developments have concluded that the time is not
now propitious. There have been momentous changes in this
area of the law in recent years and we are going through a
period of what in air flights is called "turbulence." Professor
Ren6 David considers that the time is not suitable for a fundamental revision of the French Code Civil; Professor Cr6peau considers that the Quebec Civil Code can be modernised
now. Most codified systems today have a substantial overlay
of case law and legislative supplementation to deal with situations unforeseeable to the original codifiers. Quebec may be
spared some of the factors of turbulence which concern us in
Britain-and revision of the code may take care of such new
developments as so called "products liability," consumer pro49. Gower, A Comment, 30 MODERN L. R. 259 (1967).
50. Vanderlinden & Topping, Ibi Renascit Jus Commune, 33 MODERN L.
R. 170, 176 (1970).
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tection, control of penalty and exemption clauses, and nofault liability."
Is this, however, a time to codify Obligations in Scotland?
A British Royal Commission under Lord Pearson's chairmanship is currently studying liability for death and personal
injury. Professor Andr6 Tunc, Chief Editor of the Torts (Delict) Volume of the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law has wisely written
In most industrialised countries the law of torts at the
moment is in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand
there has been a great increase in civil liability suits...
and an "abrupt change" in the rules which govern them. 51
-and,

again

The need for tort liability is, therefore, smaller than it
used to be. In fact in the industrial countries, tort liability is no longer the main source of compensation for personal injuries.
I am not quite sure whether the American expression
"products liability" implies an aspect of delict or of contract,
or whether it is sui generis-or perhaps all three. At all
events, its various elements are being scrutinised with a view
to uniform legislation by legal specialists at the E.E.C. in
Brussels, by the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, and by the
Pearson Commission in Britain. These are only a few illustrations of why I think codification in Scotland of the delictual
aspects of Obligations would be premature to say the least.
So far as Contract law is concerned very many aspects
are
being considered
by international
bodies
and
conferences-again with a view to uniform legislation-in
Brussels, Strasbourg, The Hague, and at the Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT1) in Rome. These various aspects range from special topics or special types of contract to consideration of the general principles of contract as
a whole. At an even wider level, certain aspects of private
contract law are being considered by organs of the United
Nations. In Europe at least it seems wise to eschew a fresh
codification of contract law until some of the work in progress
has been accomplished. Nor can one exclude the possible impact of inflation on contract law. Lawyers as well as
51. Gower at 262.
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economists in Britain may well reflect on the German experience in the Weimar Republic.
Professor Hahlo is probably right that codification of Obligations and Family Law and related matters would largely
exhaust the field of private law. The Scottish Law Commission's posture on Family Law illustrates yet another frustrating aspect of the British Constitution. In codified civilian
systems the titles on Family Law have generally required to
be brought up to date. However, before one can deal effectively with Matrimonial Property and Succession, it is virtually essential to settle the problems of dissolution of marriage
otherwise than by death. The Law of Bankruptcy is the pivot
on which Commercial law revolves. Dissolution of marriage is
a central issue in Family Law and Succession. Indeed, it is
almost more desirable to have a settled though imperfect law
of divorce than chronic uncertainty. Unfortunately, here
again Scots law is, through no fault of the Scottish Law
Commission, in an unhappy situation. As a chain reaction to
rethinking of divorce by the Church of England-an established Episcopal Church-the question of divorce law was remitted to the two British Law Commissions by their respective ministers. Each Commission reported separately in
favour of a "breakdown of marriage" solution, but the Scottish Law Commission was doubtful about the desirability of
some of the proposed English safeguards and proposed what I
still consider wiser reforms. The established Church in Scotland is Presbyterian and our law of divorce goes back to 1560.
Unfortunately, as Vice Chancellor Gower has noted, no Government in the United Kingdom will promote legislation on
controversial social issues such as divorce "unless it thinks
that votes are to be won thereby." 52 Such measures are left to
private members and the most that can be hoped for by way
of Government help is the allocation of Parliamentary time.
In England, Lord Chancellor Gardiner and others influential
in Parliament gave a fair wind to the English proposals. Accordingly, the English law of divorce was reformed by the
Divorce Law Reform Act, 1969. As Gower comments
It took us two sessions to get the Divorce Law Reform
Act through and we should not have succeeded then if the
Labour Government had not been unusually generous in,
its provision of time.
52. Id.
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No such generosity was granted to an equivalent (and I think
superior) Scottish measure, and to date six successive private
members Bills with which our Commission has been associated have foundered on the rocks of Parliamentary procedure. Another has been launched by Lord Selkirk in the
House of Lords in July, 1975 with more courage than hope
and forthwith attracted opposition from an English law lord.
Meanwhile our work on Matrimonial Property and Succession
is somewhat stultified. In Scots law we have had a long tradition of legal rights of succession conferred on surviving
spouses and children; but current fiscal policies, if pursued to
their logical conclusions, may well render that tradition of
little value except possibly to surviving spouses. Ceasar-in
the shape of the Exchequer-is likely to be the main beneficiary of a deceased's estate in the future, another aspect
of Sir Leslie Scarman's diagnosis of the waning of private
law.
Further Reflections on Law Reform
The following are a few further reflections on problems of
law reform in the civil law area of Scots law. First, I would
observe that ours may be the only law reform body which has
to deploy its very limited resources on two fronts-the one
seeking to advance, the other seeking to hold the line. How
happy would we be if we were free to concentrate on our own
selected programme subjects. However, if a Whitehall Department or if our much better equipped and more strongly
manned counterpart in London engages on work which is of
general interest, we may inexorably become involved. We
either have to show cause why Scotland should not be subjected to Great Britain or United Kingdom legislation
fashioned in London, or-as in the case of considering liability for ante-natal injury or "breach of confidence"-switch
our resources to offer what we consider preferable solutions.
Again, in any joint exercise, such as that on "exemption
clauses" we have to conform to the time scale of our better
equipped partner. If we find their solutions difficult to harmonise with our own legal system, we virtually have the onus
of establishing the case for a separate solution. Likewise,
when Whitehall Departments-which keep their legislation
plans to themselves until the last moment for tactical
reasons-propose solutions, we have to react, abandoning our
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own priorities, or accept unification without representation.
The less time we are given to react, the more likely we are to
acquiesce-but the formalities of consultation will have been
observed. The more our forces are engaged reacting to the
proposals of others, the less contribution we can make to our
own system.
Another problem which is constant and incapable of complete solution is that of "pre-emption" of law reform, that is,
proposals for reform on one level may be overtaken by different proposals regarding the same subject matter advanced
on a higher level. This may be at United Kingdom or international level. Our own Ninth Annual Report contained the
following:
We have in our work.., noticed a tendency for ideas which
are put forward in one international body to be reproduced in other such bodies considering the same or a
similar subject matter, with the result that proposals
may in this way be gradually formulated which, either
directly or indirectly, will in due course come to affect or
53
influence the law of Scotland.
In 1966--before the E.E.C. was really relevant for Britain-I
was deeply interested in the work of Jean and Anne Limpens
of Brussels on coordination of proposals for unification of law
at different levels-national, regional and universal. Their
paper "Coordinationdes Unifications" is highly relevant ten
years after its publication though much more could now be
said on the interrelation of European and international proposals for unification or harmonisation of law.
The next reflection, for a mixed system seeking to reform
the law in close association with a common law partner of
greatly superior resources, is that the London governmentin its measures to unify or harmonise British law-has too
often treated Scots law as a fit subject for the bed of Procrustes. It was stretched or lopped to correspond with English
requirements. Especially with devolution in the air it may be
questioned whether this is the right approach. The American
technique of drafting model laws which states can adopt and
adapt provides one alternative. Another operates in relation
to E.E.C. Directives aiming at "approximation of laws." In
this situation a policy is prescribed but legislative provisions
53. SCOT. LAW COM. No. 37.
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are enacted in the context of the laws of a member state. It
will be seen that there is here a compromise between the
powers of the Community and the right of member states to
legislate as they wish, and the sovereignty of the member
states to legislate as they wish, and the sovereignty of the
member states has been carefully guarded. In Britain, where
the Renton Committee has studied recently the whole question of The Preparationof Legislation, the "model law" and
"directive" solutions might well have been considered as appropriate when policy requires cooperation of a common law
and mixed jurisdiction within the same nation state. However, the possibility of devolution was withheld from the
Committee's consideration.
Justice Barham of the Louisiana Supreme Court stresses
forcibly the role of the Law Schools of this State in keeping
Louisiana within the civil law tradition. Rightly he gives
weight to the contribution of the Louisiana State Law Institute, and has paid due tribute to the Institute of Civil Law
Studies of Louisiana State University. As he discerns a vigorous legal literature-both in the form of legal treatises and
in that of learned articles infused with civilian legal
thinking-is essential for a civilian renaissance. Of this need
in Scotland I am very well aware. Justice Barham comments
Part of the response of the law schools which has accounted for a resurgence of the civilian tradition in
Louisiana has been the inclusion in the first year cur54
riculum of an introductory course in the-civil law.

This course adumbrates the Romanistic tradition which
lies behind your Civil Code, but does not give undue prominence to the more antiquarian and outmoded aspects of the
Roman law.
Naturally I applaud this development. It has always been
my view that, in Scottish Law Schools, the private law sector
English law should not be taught at all in an expository
manner, but only as an aspect of comparative law stressing
divergences from the civilian approach. There was, and is, a
constant need for an introductory course-civilian and comparative in character-to relate Scots private law both to its
history and to the ius commune of the modern civil law.
Indeed I sought for years to foster such a course in
54. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Traditionin Louisiana,33 LA.
L. REV. 357, 360 (1973).
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Scotland-a course in which scholars from Louisiana,
Quebec, South Africa, the Netherlands and France all made
notable contributions. Though I hold in highest regard some
of the distinguished scholars in the field of ancient Roman
law, nevertheless, to my mind, a course in that law unrelated
to the evolution of Scots law is not an essential preparation
for every Scottish legal practitioner. To some extent, the antiquarians have now pre-empted civilian studies in
Scotland-a development which, however much I admire the
exponents, I regret if the price must be the exclusion of extensive required instruction in the "received" civil law as a
foundation of Scots law.
Without some understanding of the background one cannot really understand the thought of the Scottish institutional writers, whose role with us is to give cohesion to the
system as a whole-much as a code does in other systems.
Their concern was with the evolved civil law of the 17th and
18th centuries. Scots private law could have been codified on
the basis of their treatises. Of course, much of what they
wrote on land law, family law and succession is out of dateas are the corresponding titles in the older codes. Sir Samuel
Cooke, Sir Leslie Scarman's successor as Chairman of the
Law Commission (for England and Wales) once observed
humorously
When the Scottish Law Commission have a problem to
solve, their first reaction is to enquire what Lord Stair
(who wrote in 1681) had to say on the matter. When, as
like as not, they discover that Lord Stair had not anticipated their particular problem, they seek to conjecture
what he would have written about it, had he thought of it.
In fact, the learned judge is not far wrong-at least where
I am concerned-in many fields such as obligations and moveable property. However, my main point in this context is to
echo Justice Barham's concern for the laying of civilian foundations for the legal education of the practicing and teaching
profession-judges, counsel and jurists--the responsibility of
formulating, enacting and enforcing proposals for law reform
ultimately rests.

It is certainly true that I have not been able to speak
with the confidence and freedom of my predecessors in the
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Tucker Civil Law Lectures. Of all the mixed systems, that of
Scotland has survived longest under heavier pressures than
might have seemed sustainable. I myself consider that civil
law and common law can in many respects coexist-pursuing
like ends of political, economic and social policy, but each system must use its own techniques. At supra-national levelsand in the case of Louisiana and Scots law-at national level,
the systems may reasonably attempt a concordat, but as
equal partners and by proper evaluation of comparative
sources.
Professor David, in classifying legal families, stresses the
desirability of taking into consideration the constant elements rather than the less stable rules important though
they may be.5 5 David also notes that the Romano-Germanic
family of law and the Common Law have tended, particularly
in recent years, to draw closer together, and that the methods
employed by each are not wholly dissimilar; 56 as a result, very
similar substantive solutions are often provided in each family. The concept of a "western family of law" is reinforced by
the phenomenon of the "mixed jurisdictions" such as
Louisiana and Scotland. However, both Professor David and
Professor Tunc stress the essential structure or style of the
civilian tradition. This is not lightly to be sacrificed in the
interests of unification. The form in which law is presented is
to my mind almost as important as its substance, a proposition which I shall strive to maintain-fortified by the example
of tenacity with which Colonel John H. Tucker has maintained the civilian tradition here in Louisiana.
To conclude my thoughts I venture to quote a short passage from the paper I delivered here in Louisiana in 1963:
A few days before Appomattox that high minded Virginian, Robert E. Lee, observed to General Pendleton "I
have never believed that we could, against the gigantic
combination for our subjugation, make good in the long
run our independence unless foreign powers should directly or indirectly assist us," which he did not expect,
"But," he continued, "such considerations really made
with me no difference. .. ." Something of this spirit may
55. R. DAVID, LES GRANDES SYSTt MES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAIN 13

(1964).

56. Id. at 21.
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inspire us in our less dramatic situations when reforming
our mixed systems; but unlike Lee, we need not despair of
our cause because we do not necessarily stand alone but
may invoke if we wish the wide world of the civil law to
5 7
correct a jurisprudential imbalance.
57. T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed
Jurisdictions,"in CIviL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 4 (A. Yiannopoulos ed.
1965).

